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Edward Gibbon and his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire contends 
with questions of the rise and impact of Christianity upon Roman policy and governance from 
Nero to Constantine. Gibbon’s narrative struggles with ascertaining the degree of influence that 
Christian thought held on Roman polity and the Empire’s fall, at times identifying deleterious 
Christian acts and at others leaving Christian significance ambiguous. It is this discordance in 
Gibbon between a narrative of Christian responsibility for and stymieing of the fall that leaves 
the extent of Christianity’s impact largely indeterminate.   
Gibbon’s treatment of the Christian question commences with a review of Christian 
persecution under the Romans. Gibbon frames the Christian faith as innocent and free from any 
culpability that would have warranted persecution, positing that “if we seriously consider the 
purity of the christian1 [sic] religion, the sanctity of its moral precepts,”2 how are we to 
understand their rejection by Roman authorities? Gibbon does not acknowledge here 
foundational aspects that form the crux of early Christian piety. Gibbon, indeed, fails to take into 
account Christianity’s peculiar “kind of polarization to its audience at various points in what may 
be called pagan theology—a polarization that pricked or alarmed the observer,”3 as Ramsay 
MacMullen describes in his magisterial account of the Christianization of the Empire. 
Christianity, for Gibbon, is presented as uniquely independent and imbued with favorable 
qualities. As Gibbon argues, we would imagine Christians to “have been received with due 
reverence, even by the unbelieving world.”4 Gibbon seems unable throughout his account—as 
with other questions surrounding Christianity—to provide an explanation of why Christianity 
was subject to this greater degree of persecution. If this Christianity in his History was truly an 
uncorrupted faith in its purest form, then the impetus for Roman persecution remains decidedly 
unclear.   
In assessing Christian influence, MacMullen urges us to be wary of “generalizing” and 
that, to avoid such a methodological trap, the “historical conclusion must be shown to arise out 
of the minds of the people being studied.”5 Gibbon, however, disregards that advice in 
contending from the outset that the “religious policy of the ancient world seems to have assumed 
a more stern and intolerant character.”6 He offers as his only evidence for this sentiment one 
instance: that of the Christian persecution. Gibbon seems to acknowledge the precarious standing 
of his generalizations on Christian oppression under Roman rule, offering that he will seek to 
“separate (if it be possible) a few authentic, as well as interesting, facts from an undigested mass 
of fiction and error.”7 However, Gibbon does not address that this “mass of fiction and error” has 
already been considered and digested by somebody, viz. ecclesiastical historians and the 
“sectaries of a persecuted religion.”8 Gibbon’s reasoning here demonstrates a critical flaw in his 
History: because he is consistently mistrustful of ecclesiastical sources and those that deal with 
ecclesiastical subjects, he overlooks the value of these sources in rectifying some of the 
ambiguity surrounding Christianity’s influence from, admittedly, a specific perspective. 
Nevertheless, disregarding sources on the basis of disagreement fails to enlighten the historical 
truth around Christianity’s ultimate place in the fall itself.  
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While Gibbon is skeptical of ecclesiastical sources, he examines the traditional account 
of Christ’s existence by relying, in part, on the contents of classical histories and those of their 
objectors. Gibbon argues that the failure of these “carnal men,” viz. the “pagan multitude”9 and 
historians of the time, is their inability to “acknowledge his [Christ’s] stupendous triumph over 
the powers of darkness and of the grave” and their poor treatment of the “ignominious death, of 
the divine author of christianity.”10 Gibbon goes further, identifying as particularly egregious the 
treatment of the “birth and character of our Saviour [sic] with the most impious contempt” by the 
pagan objector Celsus in his Origen.11 Gibbon demonstrates, on this occasion, a willingness to 
argue in favor of the Christian narrative and consider the value of early classical sources. What is 
perplexing, however, is Gibbon’s oscillation between reverence for a particular aspect of the 
faith (e.g., Christ’s divinity) and his simultaneous critique throughout the History of the perfidy 
of its institutions. Gibbon, despite his disdain for these sources, still appears to be reticent to 
make any outright condemnation of Christian beliefs.   
Gibbon, notes J.W. Swain in his biography of the historian, would go on to write in his 
memoirs that he still believes “the propagation of the gospel and the triumph of the Church are 
inseparably connected with the decline of the Roman Monarchy.”12 Concurrently, Gibbon 
himself would admit to his historical liberality in constructing the History, writing that he had 
treated the primitive Church “with some freedom.”13 Gibbon does not resolve this tension 
between competing positions, instead weighing the import of Celsus and his validity against an 
interest in promoting a narrative that presents a reverential view of Christ. This 
incommensurability between Gibbon’s respect for Christ as man and his relation of its history 
may have been the result of the approach Gibbon adopted: as Roy Porter suggests in his account 
of the man, “Gibbon the philosophical historian made religious belief itself into a historical 
problem.”14 The shift from a theological disputation to historical inquiry on the value of religion 
make Gibbon’s History appear as both an account of the validity of religion and a flawed critique 
that disregards certain foundational texts.  
Further, Gibbon’s concern with the question of intention, especially his non-committal 
attitude towards a condemnation of Roman behavior, informs much of his apparent uncertainty 
with Christianity’s station itself. Gibbon seems unable to resolve the intention of Christians in 
the exercise of their faith and the intention of the Romans in the exercise of their authority. He 
predicates an argument on Christian consciousness by presupposing a “personal guilt which 
every christian had contracted”15 as an element inherent in the practice and one contrary to the 
institutional faith. The source of this intention is never identified and, rather, Gibbon adduces 
only the Roman conferral of the “privileges of private corporations…bestowed with a very 
sparing hand”16 as evidence for a Roman sentiment adverse to opposing viewpoints. This 
discourse presents an unsteady history whose faulting gait erodes Gibbon’s larger argument of 
Christian expansion. If the rise of Christianity and the subsequent Roman persecution aimed to 
sow “the principle of discord” and keep the spirit of belligerence “alive in their bosom,”17 
Gibbon has not proved there to be a clear Christian or Roman intention that would have 
precipitated the persecutions. Instead, Gibbon suggests that the best that can be done is to 
continue speculation, such that a Roman distrust of Christians generally is admittedly only a 
“probable supposition” supported “by the evidence of authentic facts.”18 The qualification of 
these intentions as a “supposition” evinces the perpetual lack of clarity over Christianity’s 
contribution to the fall and Gibbon’s obstinance to seek answers among other sources.  
Gibbon continues, seeking to explain the particular actions that underlay Roman violence 
against Christian practitioners. Here, there is a demonstration of a measure of caution and 
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commentary on the limitations of sourcing, with Gibbon urging that history not serve to “plead 
the cause of tyrants or to justify the maxims of persecution.”19 This notwithstanding, Gibbon 
concludes that men such as Charles V and Louis XVI had access to “a just knowledge of the 
rights of conscience, of the obligation of faith, and of the innocence of error” whereas the 
“princes and magistrates of ancient Rome,”20 lacked a commensurate familiarity with such 
ideology. This apologia of historical ignorance toward conceptions of faith and liberty of 
conscience still does not clarify what specific Roman considerations engendered Christian 
oppression. These questions are left unanswered. Gibbon cites Tacitus’ account that Romans 
understood Christians to be guilty of “their hatred of human kind,”21 though does not go much 
further than that. Indeed, the tension remains unresolved, leaving us to conclude that from this 
uncertainty we can “presume to imagine some probable cause which could direct the cruelty of 
Nero against the christians of Rome.”22 This absence of certainty in identifying the elements 
which brought about the Roman persecution demonstrates Gibbon’s fondness for never stepping 
“far beyond the gut prejudices of engagé Protestant historians”23 when discussing clerical history 
and the impact of Christian interests on Roman stability.  
Perhaps an answer to the intentionality of both parties lies in the realm of ecclesiastical 
histories, which are simultaneously derided and praised by Gibbon. Gibbon contends that he 
“purposefully refrained from describing the particular sufferings and deaths of the christian [sic] 
martyrs.”24 While admitting that the accounts of both Eusebius and Lactantius may be replete 
with an extensive coverage of these sufferings (and perhaps also an account of widely-held 
Roman beliefs),25 Gibbon casts doubt on their veracity by virtue of their content: “these 
melancholy scenes might be enlivened by a crowd of visions and miracles…to celebrate the 
triumph, or to discover the relics, of those canonized saints who suffered for the name of 
Christ.”26 Gibbon, here, takes as inconclusive any account of martyrdom during the prosecutions 
that is ecclesiastical in nature, particularly when such an account contains details that might 
affirm a Christian tenet contrary to his Enlightenment rationality. The general dismissal of 
Eusebius and Lactantius because of their Christian mystical identities overlooks their potential 
value as a cultural account that can be qualified within a given context. Rather than present a 
valid critique of Eusebius’ methodologies, Gibbon goes further to discredit him, noting in dicta 
that “it is well known that he [Eusebius] himself had been thrown into prison.”27 What bearing 
this holds on his accuracy as a historian and the reasons for his imprisonment remain 
unexplained: we are instead left to assume that Gibbon takes issue principally with Eusebius’ 
character and that, accordingly, the value of the source is nullified. This critique of certain 
sources speaks to, as Porter suggests, Gibbon’s aversion to Christianity while living in a world 
still reeling from the “unfeigned horror…[of]…the fanaticism which had brought the sword and 
the Inquisition to Europe almost within living memory.”28 Gibbon appears to suffer from a 
recollection of historical Christianity at its worst and seems unable to overcome this as he 
considers ecclesiastical descriptions of the persecution. This obstinance towards religious 
sources interferes with Gibbon’s ability to answer clearly any question of Roman intentionality. 
How can he begin to draw widespread assumptions of Christian cultural belief and doctrine if he 
does not incorporate fully the histories—however inaccurate in historic detail they may prove to 
be—that are written by the proselytizing faithful themselves? 
Despite his discrediting of certain sources, there is still a sense of certainty apparent when 
discussing and dismissing ecclesiastical histories that, in its style, attempts to impart a sense of 
authority on Gibbon’s commentary:  
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it is certain, and we may appeal to the grateful confessions of the first christians, that the 
great part of those magistrates who exercised in the provinces the authority of the 
emperor…behaved like men of polished manners and liberal education, who respected the rules 
of justice, and who were conversant with the precepts of philosophy.29 
The exact source that affirms this historical certainty is not specified, however, Gibbon’s 
allusion to a wider acceptance of Christian practice or, at minimum, a toleration within the 
provinces seems counter to certain martyrdom accounts circulated by Eusebius, et al. While the 
extent of martyrdom is doubtless a valid topic for historical inquiry, there is no attempt by 
Gibbon to examine its credibility with the introduction of sources. Further, Gibbon’s 
commentary on internal strife within the early Church demonstrates his belief of the Church as 
an institution whose principal contribution had been “centuries of religious warfare”30 and whose 
practitioners, “in the course of their intestine dissensions, have inflicted far greater severities on 
each other, than they had experienced from the zeal of infidels.”31 As one instance of this internal 
dissension, Gibbon cites the condemnation of Nestorius, writing that “the profane magistrate was 
driven with outrage and insult from the assembly of the saints…the partial extracts from the 
letters and homilies of Nestorius were interrupted by curses and anathemas: and the heretic was 
degraded from his episcopal and ecclesiastical dignity.”32 Here, the faithful had yet again 
demonstrated their ability to disrupt and denigrate the state to Gibbon, leading him to recollect 
that “Protestant zeal”33 around criticism is directed towards the early Church and not the later. 
Still, Gibbon’s characterization of the institutional Church is predicated on specific instances 
within the ambit of “heresy, schism and fraternal persecution,”34 rather than affording 
consideration to the concomitant historical efforts in monastic preservation of texts and provision 
for the sick. Again, historical institution action seems to beget Gibbon’s inability to see the 
Church in its totality.35 
Separate but interrelated to Gibbon’s credulity regarding ecclesiastical sources, Gibbon 
also calls into question the intentions of the martyrs themselves. As one means of diverting 
responsibility for Christian persecution, Gibbon describes the ardour of the martyrs, recalling 
that Ignatius demanded “that when he should be exposed in the amphitheatre [sic], they [the 
Romans] would not, by their kind but unseasonable intercession, deprive him of the crown of 
glory.”36 Here, the Romans are presented as upholding the “restraints which the emperors had 
provided for the security of the church,”37 whereas it is the “fortitude of believers” that have 
gone “beyond the bounds of prudence or reason.”38 Thus, Gibbon appears to question who is 
responsible for martyrdom: is it the Romans, who imposed their “restraints,” or the Christians by 
way of their alleged imprudent actions? Gibbon also draws attention to the sourcing here, noting 
that the “behaviour [sic] of the Christians was too remarkable to escape the notice of the ancient 
philosophers.”39 However, Gibbon is careful to specify that these philosophers understood 
Christian action “with much less admiration than astonishment,”40 implying that others—namely 
ecclesiastical historians—offered a position of admiration for martyrs that is to be discouraged.   
Gibbon’s distrust of Christian accounts and their intentions is perhaps most prevalent, 
however, in his review of the edicts of Tiberius and Marcus Antoninus. Here, Gibbon again 
challenges an ecclesiastical history, contending that in Tertullian’s apology:  
we are required to believe, that (emphasis added) Pontius Pilate informed the emperor of 
the unjust sentence of death which he had pronounced against an innocent, and, as it appeared, a 
divine person; and that, without acquiring the merit, he exposed himself to the danger, of 
martyrdom.41 
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Gibbon seems unable to rectify a Tertullian account when such an account “escaped the 
knowledge of the historians of Greece and Rome” and was “only visible to the eyes of an 
African christian, who composed his apology one hundred and sixty years after the death of 
Tiberius.”42 Gibbon here exhibits that characteristic for which he was so often condemned, viz. 
that he could “never rest satisfied with its [Christianity’s] conventional expressions as provided 
by the Churches.”43 Gibbons insinuations of dishonesty on the part of Tertullian play into his 
distrust of the “Church with its priests and monks, its popes and saints, its miracles, and its 
absurd theological wrangles.”44 Doubtless, the act of questioning Tertullian’s account is not the 
crux of the issue: rather, it is the wholesale condemnation absent an attempt to present Gibbon’s 
presumably accurate sources that demonstrates an absence of historical certainty. On balance, the 
portrayal of Christianity in the History seems distorted acutely on questions that engage those 
“theological wrangles,” and Gibbon is far more sympathetic to Christianity in its purest and most 
unencumbered early form of the disciples.  
The account of the Incarnation of Christ is one probative example, where Gibbon states 
that “his [Christ’s] progress from infancy to youth and manhood, was marked by a regular 
increase in stature and wisdom; and after a painful agony of mind and body, he expired on the 
cross. He lived and died for the service of mankind…the tears which he shed over his friend and 
country, may be esteemed the purest evidence of his humanity.”45 There is a certain degree of 
reverence here, a reverence often unmentioned in the critical tracts against the History, that 
demonstrates Gibbon’s willingness to undertake a new program of historical exploration that 
provides a measure of unity to the secular and sectarian. As Porter notes, the confluence of 
“histories of the Church” and “histories of Rome”—and the “investigation of their interrelation 
from a secular point of view”46—presents perhaps one instance of Gibbon’s historical ingenuity, 
his treatment of ecclesiastical sources notwithstanding. It had always been his intent, wrote 
Gibbon, to undertake in “an age of light and liberty…an enquiry into the human (emphasis 
added) causes of the progress and establishment of Christianity.”47 Approaching the History 
from the position that Gibbon sought to understand the actions of man relative to Christianity, his 
approval of certain sources and derogation of others seems, at the least, predicated on an interest 
in reason. While Gibbon weighs martyrs against the interests of man in advancing the Church, he 
still acknowledges that for many citizens “religion was their only crime.”48 Christianity and its 
contributions to the fall, still uncertain, at times seem to almost stymie Rome’s decline. 
Indeed, Gibbon cites Christianity as a contributing factor in elevating the esteem and 
influence of Constantine. That “partial and increasing favour [sic] of Constantine” may be 
attributed to the “esteem which he entertained for the moral character of the christians.”49 
Therein lies the value of Christianity: it serves to “inculcate the practice of private and public 
virtue”50 and presents exactly the mechanism necessary to provide some measure of peace and 
civility to the empire. Gibbon, then, seems to find fault with the institution and not per se the 
theological practice. His observation that “the catholic princes connected their own interest with 
that of the clergy, and enforced by fire and the sword the terrors of spiritual censures”51 appears 
drastically out of place next to his statement that the Christian vision offers “the people a pure, 
benevolent, and universal system of ethics, adapted to every duty and every condition of life.”52 
This constant struggle, perhaps intentional, between a position that suggests corruption of the 
Church and also advances the virtue of religion leaves the impact of Christianity on the fall 
noticeably unresolved throughout the History. His hatred toward the faith is tempered at times, 
yet also manifestly present in his attacks of the institution that propagates it.  
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What, then, can be said about Christianity for Gibbon? He seems certain of the facts in 
many accounts yet leaves the more significant questions of theology variable. It seems evident 
that Gibbon does not display a hostility towards Christianity to the full extent that critics often 
advance, though he nevertheless takes exception to a certain, as Swain suggests, “priestly avarice 
and lust for power” manifest in the institutional Church itself. Can it be said, however, that his 
disregard of certain ecclesiastical contributions amounts to a wholesale rejection of the value of 
Christian doctrine? Certainly not. Gibbon, as Porter suggests, fought a philosophical war in the 
History and “reprobated religious bigotry,”53 constantly aiming to demonstrate that institutional 
Christianity’s undoing lay with the fact that Christianity “had also come with a sword.”54 The 
divisional and fractured Christianity that Gibbon condemns, the Christianity that has “naturally 
led [us] to enquire what confidence can be placed in the doubtful and imperfect monuments of 
ancient credulity,”55 is to be viewed independent of any study of the “pure” Christianity in its 
original form. Thus, Gibbon challenges us in the History to view Christianity and its influence on 
the fall in two forms: as a practice, strictly regulated under Christ’s teachings, and as an 
institution, subject to the concomitant degradation that comes from any organized structure.  
Assuming that Gibbon seeks to understand Christianity in two forms throughout the 
History, his narrative still leaves no definite answer to where Christianity falls with respect to the 
question of Roman prosperity. Did it merely suspend the fall or was its introduction the 
watershed which invariably marked the fall’s commencement? Christianity, for Gibbon, seems a 
question that never was nor could be clarified fully. Its irresolution seems to personally haunt 
him, with Gibbon shifting from his earlier position and writing in his final years that he is now 
“far more inclined to dispute this comfortable doctrine,” concluding that he will soon be greeted 
by the “faith of enthusiasts who sing Hallelujahs above the clouds.”56 Gibbon’s History stands as 
that historical representation of the secular and the sectarian, a departure from the philosophical 
tracts of the ancients and ecclesiastics. For Gibbon, though his critics were loath to admit, was 
among a new brand, “the chief, perhaps the only, English writer who has any claim to be 
considered an ecclesiastical historian.”57 Gibbon’s Christianity, then, is both that “fabric of 
superstition…which might long have defied the feeble efforts of reason”58 and a source of 
resolute strength in the reign of Constantine. It is perhaps inconclusive in character, being neither 
guilty of engendering the fall nor wholly faultless in its collapse, setting the bar of Christian 
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